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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

vs.

:

CARLOS MAURICE HEARON

:

Case No. 20020263-CA

Defendants/Appellants
:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT,
SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
TRANSIENT AND EVIDENCE THAT HIS CHILDREN HAD
BEEN REMOVED FROM HIS HOME?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was preserved for appeal by objection of
counsel (R. 074/ pg 69 on the DCFS issue, and R. 074/ pg 70 on the homeless
issue) The standard of review is "Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is
reviewed for abuse of discretion." See State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999),
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). However, "admission of prior crimes evidence
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itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of that
discretion." (Id) In other words, failure of a trial court to undertake a scrupulous
examination in connection with the admission of prior bad act evidence constitutes
an abuse of discretion." State v. Webster, 32 P.3d 976 (Utah App 2000)
"We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior crimes or other
bad acts under an abuse of discretion standard." State v.Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278
(Utah 2001); State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S.
1164 (2000). "However, in the proper exercise of that discretion, trial judges must
scrupulously examine the evidence before it is admitted." State v. Widdison, 28
P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001) (quoting Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999)." State v.
Bisner, 37 P.3d 1073 (Utah 2001).
POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE
DEFENDANT, SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE REGARDING AN
ALLEGED THEFT OF A MUSTANG VEHICLE?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not properly preserved for
appeal(R. 074/ pg 6,12,14,31,37,39,83,91), although after several references
defense counsel finally objected (R. 074/ pg 78) therefore the plain error standard
applies. "To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is
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harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d
170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) and State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993).
POINT III
DID THE ELICITATION OF OTHER BAD ACTS EVIDENCE
AND THE COMMENTING ON THAT EVIDENCE DURING
OPENING AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS CONSTITUTE
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not fully and properly preserved for
appeal, and therefore the plain error standard applies. "To establish plain error, a
defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact occur, (2) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT
App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) and
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). "In order to demonstrate
prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that "'the actions or remarks of..
counsel call to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in
considering in determining its verdict." State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See
also State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7 (Utah 2000)(quoting State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d
925, 928 (Utah Ct.App. 1998)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
SECTION 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
3

(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from
a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as
otherwise authorized by this chapter;
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same,
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
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conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements
ofRules402and403.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant is charged in a single count information dated December 7,
2001 with the offense of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i). On December 7, 2001,
the defendant made an initial appearance and the information was read. On
December 18, 2001, the defendant waived his preliminary hearing and the matter
was set for trial for February 12, 2002. The defense moved to continue the trial
and a jury trial was held on May 31, 2002 with the Honorable Judge Roger S.
Dutson presiding.
After a one day jury trial, the jury returned with a guilty verdict, and on July
9, 2002, the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed
five years in the Utah State Prison. The prison term was suspended and the
defendant was placed on probation with a jail term of 180 days with credit for time
served, as a condition of probation. The defendant began his 180-day jail term on
July 29, 2002.
This judgment and conviction was entered on July 11, 2002 and the
defendant filed his notice of appeal on August 9,2002.

5

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).

At trial the prosecutor elicited

testimony from Officer Jeff Pickrell that he arrested the defendant on an
outstanding traffic warrant. (R.074/pgl6) Officer Pickrell then transported the
defendant to the Weber County Jail and searched him. (R. 074/ pg 22) During the
search the officer found a "small plastic baggie with white residue" in the
defendant's right front pocket. (R. 074/ pg 23) The officer asked the defendant
about this and the defendant told him "it looked like meth, but it was not his." (R.
074/ pg 23) The evidence was seized and taken to the State Crime Lab where it
was analyzed by Julianna Taylor a criminalist. Julianna Taylor took the baggie
which "just had residue in it" and 'rinsed it out with methanol and ran it on the
GCMS." (R. 074/ pg 56) The residue tested positive for methamphetamine. (R.
074/pg58).
The only real issue before the jury was whether the defendant knowingly
possessed the methamphetamine. The defense called as its sole witness Sherry
Richards who testified that she had gone through every pocket of his pants looking
for money the morning of the arrest and search and did not see the baggie.(R. 074/
pgs 65-67) She also testified that she observed a search of the defendant by the
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police prior to transportation to the jail in which the baggie was not found. (R. 074/
pgs 68,69) Neither officer recalled whether or not such a search had occurred.
The testimony and argument at trial was relatively short (87 pages) and was
completed in less than a day. During the course of the trial the state made
numerous references to other bad acts of the defendant. Beginning in the
prosecutors opening statement, references were made to the defendant having
knowledge of a stolen Mustang vehicle (R. 074/ pg 6) and that the defendant was
at the offices of Child Welfare. (R. 074/ pg 7) During the testimony of the state's
first witness, Officer Pickrell, reference was again made to the stolen Mustang and
that the officer was "looking for Carlos Hearon to talk with about [the]case." (R.
074/ pgl2) The victim of the Mustang theft had notified the police that he had
seen the defendant. (R. 074/ pg 13) and the officer testified that he "was looking
for Mr. Hearon." (R. 074/ pg 13) The officer first makes contact with the
defendant at the DCFS parking lot. (R. 074/ pg 14)The defendant was never
charged with automobile theft (R. 074/ pg31)
The state's second witness was Officer Derek Draper. He testified, among
other things, that "there was a report of a possible suspect (the defendant)" in the
Mustang theft case. (R. 074/ pg 37) That the suspect was at "900 Capitol... around
that area at that (DCFS) building." (R. 074/ pg 37) He was told to "just go and stop
the suspect" and that that suspect was the defendant. (R. 074/ pg 37) He stopped
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the defendant and told him that "you match the description in this case and another
officer needs to talk to you" (R. 074/ pg 38) Officer Draper further testified that
Officer Pickrell told him to go retrieve the Mustang, (R. 074/ pg 39) and that he
"detained the suspect." (R. 074/ pg 39) He then "left to find the car that was in
question," and then "CSI arrived, processed the vehicle, took some photos and
stuff of that nature"(R. 074/ pg 41) On cross examination he testified that he
released the car to the owner. (R. 074/ pg 41)
The defendant's sole witness, Sherry Richards, testified that she and the
defendant went to DCFS for an appointment. (R. 074/ pg 67) The first question
from the prosecutor on cross-examination was "[What] was the reason for the trip
to DCFS?" (R. 074/ pg 69) and next, "Where were [the children]?" to which the
witness answered "They were in State's custody." (R. 074/ pg 69) Defense counsel
immediately objected and the judge sustained. The next question was "You said
that you'd gone to DCFS from the Stonehedge apartments in Layton City."(R. 074/
pg 70) Then the prosecutor asked "And, in fact, wasn't Carlos essentially transient
or homeless at the time?" to which the defense objected. Apparently the judge
overruled the objection at a sidebar conference since the next question was "Isn't it
true that he was essentially transient, homeless?"(R. 074/ pg 70) Shortly thereafter,
the prosecutor asked "What car was it you took into Ogden?"(R. 074/ pg 74) and
then inquired as to the witness and the defendant parking the car over 2 Vi blocks
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from the DCFS building.(R. 074/ pgs 74,75) The prosecutor ask "But you didn't
park at DCFS did you?".(R. 074/ pg 75)

He further inquired "[T]hey've got

parking at the DCFS building, don't they?" and "But you chose not to use the
parking lot?"(R. 074/ pg 78) The prosecutor later asked "In fact, the vehicle was
registered to somebody else" and "In fact the title was held by somebody else
wasn't it?" (R. 074/ pg 78) At this point, defense counsel objected, and apparently
the judge sustained the objection without comment to the jury.
During closing argument the prosecutor stated "In fact, they're out there
because they're investigating this dispute about the 1989 Ford Mustang report of
auto theft," and that officer Draper was asked to "detain the defendant there in the
area of DCFS." The officer told the defendant "I just need to talk to you for a
minute." (R. 074/ pg 83) He then stated "And the father or the mother of the
children is inside DCFS at that time having a visit with their children." He goes
on with the statement "in talking to him about the car ... he found out that [the
defendant] had a warrant for his arrest."
Defense counsel then spends almost half of his closing argument trying to
explain away the car theft problem.(R. 074/ pgs 85-87)
In his rebuttal, the prosecutor again gratuitously mentions DCFS (R. 074/ pg
88) and then, referring to the testimony of Sherry Richards, asks the jury "and let's
see what we can infer about her testimony there."(R. 074/ pg 91) "They don't park

9

at the DCFS building; they park a block and a half, two blocks away at least.",
"And they're there for a visit with the children." (R. 074/ pg 91) Finally, in
response to the prosecutors statement "And during that time she's supposedly
having her visit with her children there at DCFS" defense counsel objects. The
judge overrules the objection.(R. 074/ pg 92)
The jury then finds the defendant guilty of the offense.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The case on trial was uncomplicated. The State was required to establish,
beyond a reasonable doubt three basic elements of the offense as follows: The
defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally, (2) possessed, (3) a controlled
substance.1 For purposes of this appeal, the defendant concedes that the evidence is
sufficient with regards to elements 2 and 3, in that the testimony is undisputed that
the baggie of residue was found on the defendant, and the residue was
methamphetamine.

The only real issue was the intent or knowledge of the

defendant regarding the drug possession. Did the defendant intend to possess the
baggie of residue, or did he know that the baggie was in his pocket. The errors at
trial consist of numerous references to irrelevant facts that resulted in the improper
prejudice of the jury toward the defendant. The prosecution intentionally and
repeatedly put on evidence inferring that the defendant was a suspect in a theft of a

1

Jurisdiction and identity of the defendant were not an issue at trial, nor are they at issue in this appeal.
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Ford Mustang, despite the fact that the original stop was not at issue. The search
was incident to the arrest on the outstanding traffic warrant, and therefore proper.
The prosecutor asked numerous questions and made statements inferring that the
defendant was a bad or abusive parent since DCFS had removed his children from
his home, and inferring he was an undesirable person because he was transient.
None of these facts, even if they were true, had any probative value to the elements
of the offense, or to any defense propounded by the defendant. The only logical
explanation as to why the prosecutor repeatedly referred to these things is to bias
or prejudice the jury against the defendant in order to overcome the weakness in
his case with regard to mens rea.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE
OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE DEFENDANT,
SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
TRANSIENT AND EVIDENCE THAT HIS CHILDREN HAD
BEEN REMOVED FROM HIS HOME?
During the course of the trial, the prosecutor put on evidence that the
defendant was transient and that his children had been removed from the home,
and that he and the mother were visiting with the children at the Division of Child
and Family Services (DCFS) facility. These areas of inquiry were objected to by
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the defense, and the trial court, without making any findings, determined that both
areas of inquiry would be allowed into evidence2.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of evidence provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the
requirements of 402 and 403.
The evidence in question was presumably introduced for the purpose of
showing foundation, however, the trial court made his rulings at sidebar
conferences, or with no explanation, and therefore no record of this analysis was
preserved.
The Supreme Court has struggled with the rule of other crime evidence
under Rule 404(b) in recent years. The Court in 1997 issued the opinion of State v.
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) and then in 1999 issued the opinion of State v.
Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) in which they reassessed and to some extent
overruled Doporto.
In the case of State v. Decorso, the Court held "admission of prior crimes
evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper

2

The defense originally objected to the inquiry as to the state custody of the children which
was sustained by the trial court,(R. 074/ pg 70) Later the court overruled the defense
objection allowing the prosecutor to comment on this issue. (R. 074/ pg 91,92)
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exercise of that discretion." {Id at 843) The court then described the required twopronged analysis the trial court must utilize in making a ruling on this issue. First,
the trial court must determine whether the evidence is being offered for a proper
non-character purpose.

Second, the trial court must determine whether the

evidence tends to prove some fact material to the crime charged, and whether its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. {Id at
843,844) (see also State v. Bluff, 52 P.3d 1210, 1226 (Utah 2002) where the court
held: Other crime evidence is admissible if it "tends to prove some fact that is
material to the crime charged — other than the defendant's propensity to commit
crime." DeCorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999). The court further held "although the
contested evidence in DeCorso was evidence of a prior crime, the acts here appear
to have been perfectly lawful, whereas we find the reasoning of that case
applicable and persuasive.")
Further, the court must also make a balancing determination as required
under rule 403. In the case of State v. Bluff 52 P.3d 1210, 1227 (Utah 2002) the
Court described this process:
In deciding whether the danger of unfair prejudice and the like
substantially outweighs the incremental probative value, a variety of
matters must be considered, including the strength of the evidence as
to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the
need for evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to
which the evidence will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.
13

In the present case, the trial court did none of this. Conceivably it could be
argued that the State offered the evidence for foundation purposes. The problem is
that foundation is not one of the listed non-character purposes in 404(b). If this
Court determines that foundation falls within the parameters of "other purposes",
there still exists the problem that the record is absolutely devoid of any analysis
under Rule 403 of the prejudicial effect that this evidence would have on the
defendant in the minds of the jury. Such an analysis is required both under Rule
404(b) as well as by State v. Decorso and its progeny.
In the present case, there can be no argument that the evidence was offered
for purposes of "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." ( URE Rule 404(b)) The fact that the
defendant went to the offices of DCFS is useless to the jury on those purposes.
Neither does the transient or homeless status of the defendant assist the jury in
deciding any element of the offense or purposes behind such elements. The only
effect that this evidence had on the jury was to bias the jury toward the defendant.
The fact that this information is gratuitously brought to the attention of the jury on
numerous occasions including eight (8) separate references to DCFS in closing

3

See also State v.Colwell 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000) where the Prosecution committed error
in inquiring into the particulars of the defendant's previous convictions which were
divulged in his direct examination.
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argument alone4, suggests the improper motive of the prosecutor to bias the jury
against the defendant with these statements5.
Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to properly preserve these
issues for appeal, this Court would then review these prejudicial statements under a
plain error standard. In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App.
1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not reverse unless
we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both obvious and
harmful". The Court further ruled "An error is harmful if the likelihood of a
different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (Id. at
1010J. This Court, in the case of State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App.
1990) has held; "Generally, inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been
found to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error". This Court further observed,
"In such cases, the court will reach the issue on appeal despite the lack of
objection". (Id. at 821). See also United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th
Cir. 1987). In the present case, the inquiry into the area of the DCFS custody of
the children should fall into that same category. These details should be so
prejudicial as to amount to plain error.

4

References made in the Record 074: 2 times on page 83, again on page 88, and 5
times on page 91.
5
The prosecutor argues that somehow this evidence goes to show the inability of
the witness Sherry Richards to properly observe and remember the events on that
day.
15

If this Court finds that the trial court committed error in its ruling on the
admissibility of this evidence, the court must then determine whether or not that
error was harmful. The harmful nature of this evidence appears obvious but is
highlighted by the numerous attempts it was used by the prosecutor to prejudice
the jury against the defendant. One of the most telling examples of this attempt to
prejudice the jury is during the rebuttal argument of the prosecutor where the
prosecutor asks the jury "Let's see what we can infer about her testimony there.
They don't park at the DCFS building; they park a block and a half, two blocks
away at least. And they're there for a visit with the children." (R. 074/ pg91
emphasis added) The error is harmful, and the effects were calculated. The
evidence of knowledge of possession of the residue was circumstantial and any
evidence that goes toward biasing the jury toward the defendant had to have an
effect on the outcome of their deliberations.
POINT II
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS OF THE
DEFENDANT, SPECIFICALLY, EVIDENCE REGARDING AN
ALLEGED THEFT OF A MUSTANG VEHICLE?
On numerous occasions throughout the trial, the prosecutor elicited
testimony regarding a stolen Ford Mustang vehicle. The witnesses infer throughout
their testimony and the prosecutor accuses in his closing, that the defendant had
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some involvement in this theft6. This issue is only objected to on one occasion late
in the trial and therefore the defense concedes that they must establish plain error
to prevail on this point.
"To establish plain error, a defendant must show: (1) an error did in fact
occur, (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is
harmful. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348 (See also State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d
170, 174 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010
(Utah App. 1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not
reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both
obvious and harmful". The Court further ruled "An error is harmful if the
likelihood of a different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the
verdict.'" (Id at 1010/

This Court, in the case of State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819,

821 (Utah App. 1990) has held; "Generally, inquiry into the details of prior
convictions has been found to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error". This
Court further observed, "In such cases, the court will reach the issue on appeal
despite the lack of objection". (Id. at 821). See also United States v. Roenigk, 810
F.2d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 1987).

6

In spite of the fact that the prosecutor acknowledges at the outset that the
defendant was not charged with this theft, he refers to the theft on dozens of
occasions and in closing asks the jury to infer his involvement in the theft from the
fact that he parks 2 blocks awayfromthe DCFS building.(R. 074/ pg 91)
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In the present case, Officer Draper continually refers to the defendant as the
suspect in the Mustang theft, and the prosecutor continues to reference the stolen
Mustang. The prejudicial effect of these references is enormous. Not only does the
one witness continually refer to the defendant as the suspect, he details his
detention of the defendant for purposes of questioning by Officer Pickrell who was
"currently work[ing] major crimes, primarily auto thefts". (R. 074/ pgll) The
prosecutor elicits testimony from several witnesses concerning the defendant
parking two (2) or more blocks away from their destination inferring an attempt to
hide the stolen vehicle. He further asks the jury in closing argument, "Let's see
what we can infer about her testimony there. They don't park at the DCFS
building; they park a block and a half, two blocks away at least." (R. 074/ pg91
emphasis added)
POINT III
DID THE ELICITATION OF OTHER BAD ACTS EVIDENCE
AND THE COMMENTING ON THAT EVIDENCE DURING
OPENING AND CLOSING ARGUMENTS CONSTITUTE
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT?
In the recent case of State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, the Utah Supreme Court
set forth the rule governing reversal in the event of prosecutorial misconduct. In
that case the Court held:
We will reverse a jury verdict because of prosecutorial misconduct if
we find the prosecutor's remarks were improper and harmful to
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defendant. State v. Colwell, 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000); (Citing also
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah 1986)).
In determining when a prosecutor crosses the line, the court stated that a
prosecutor's remarks will be considered improper if the remarks "called to the
juror's attention matters which they would not be justified in considering in
reaching a verdict." State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (quoting State
v. Johnson, 663 P.2d48, 51 (Utah 1983)).
In the case of State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 957 (Utah 1999) the court
declared,
"It is fundamental in our law that a person may be convicted
criminally only for his act, not for his general character. That principle
is violated if a conviction is based on an inference that conviction is
justified because of the defendant's criminal character or propensity to
commit bad acts"
In State v. Saunders the defendant made a pretrial motion in limine to
exclude alleged preinformation misconduct of a similar nature. The court allowed
questions but not details about this misconduct. Despite the fact that the issue was
not properly preserved for appeal, the court stated,
[We] hold that the trial court's pretrial order was patently erroneous as
to general evidence of prior misconduct under the plain error doctrine
and highly prejudicial. {Id. at 958 emphasis added)
The Court in State v. Saunders reversed and remanded the verdict on
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct among other things.(7tf. at 960)
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The next prong of the test is to determine if the improper remarks or actions
of the prosecutor were "harmful to the defendant." The Utah Supreme Court in the
case of State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483,486 (Utah 1984) held: "Improper remarks will
be deemed harmful if the jury was, "under the circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks." (quoting State v. Valdez, 523 P.2d 422, 426
(1973); see also State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7 (Utah 2000) (stating prosecutor's
statements harmful if they manifest error that "is substantial and prejudicial such
that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a
more favorable result."" (quoting State v. Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah
Ct.App. 1998))).
The United States Supreme Court has likewise held that when a prosecutor
crosses the line of advocacy into an area of unfairness, a criminal defendant is
entitled to a new trial. In the case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55
S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) the Court held:
"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one."
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In the case at bar, the prosecutor, on numerous occasions struck foul blows.
The prosecutors misconduct in this trial is established by virtue of the staggering
number of improper references7, as well as the total lack of relevance any of these
references have to the elements of the offense. The prosecutor admits the
irrelevance of the Mustang at the outset when he told the jury "But don't worry
about the 1989 Ford Mustang. It was recovered and, in fact, the defendant hasn't
been charged or anything in conjunction with that." (R. 074/ pg 7) Nevertheless,
the prosecutor elicited testimony concerning the Mustang on numerous occasions,
and then mentioned the Mustang or circumstances surrounding the Mustang on no
fewer than 6 occasions in his opening and closing arguments.
The prosecutor mentions DCFS so many times that it becomes a recurring
theme throughout the trial. He inquired into the reason the children were being
visited at DCFS, which was objected to and sustained by the trial judge (however
the testimony was not ever stricken nor was a curative instruction given)(R074/ pg
*7

This trial was short by any measure, consisting of merely 87 pages of transcript
from opening statement through closing statement. Reference was made by the
prosecutor to the stolen mustang, to DCFS, or to the defendant's homeless status
on 28 of those pages, which calculates to over 32% of the total trial time.
Reference is made by the defense attorney on an additional 6 pages, mostly in an
attempt to explain away the inferences made by the prosecutor. With those
additional references, a total of 34 pages of the transcript referred to these
extraneous matters. Pages of the references are as follows: 6,7,8,11,12,13,14,15,
17,18,28,31,33,37,38,39,41,67,68,69,707174,75,76,77,78,82.83.85.86.88.91.92.
(underlined pages are references made by the defense)
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70) Even in the face of that ruling, the prosecutors next question was "You said
that you'd gone to DCFS...."(R074/pg70).
Finally, the prosecutor inquired into the homeless or transient status of the
defendant over the objection of defense counsel. The trial judge, without record
allowed this inquiry. There is never any legitimate reason set forth for this line of
questions, and the record is devoid of any attempt to show its relevance.
The harm to the defendant as a result of questioning in these areas is
obvious. The jury is left to deliberate having been improperly prejudiced as to the
defendant's character. Even though the evidence of possession is relatively strong,
the element of intent or knowledge is a jury question that can easily be influenced
by this type of prejudicial posturing. In the case of State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48
(Utah 1983) the Court found that the prosecutors reference to the defendant's
receiving income while on social security as "double dipping" and "a cancer on
society", signing paychecks as "forging of signatures" and "filing for bankruptcy
as an indication of dishonesty" constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The court in
Johnson stated, "Under the circumstances of this case, there is no doubt that the
prosecutor's 'remarks called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not
be justified in considering . . . [and that they] were probably influenced by the
remarks.'" (Id. at 51) The Court ruled that the prosecutor's conduct was improper,
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and would have constituted grounds for a new trial if they had not reversed the
convictions for insufficiency of the evidence.
In the present case, the prosecutor employed "improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction." (Berger v. United States infra.) The result was
repeatedly calling "to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be
justified in considering." (State v. Johnson infra.) And like the Court in Johnson, it
is reasonable to infer that the jurors' deliberations and decision were probably
influenced by the almost continuous improper references.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendant respectfully requests this court
reverse the defendant's conviction and remand
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